§787 The failure of the League of Nations; the Allies against the Germans in Italy (1920-1946): VI-20.

VI-20 (§787):

The feigned union shall be of brief duration;
Some changed, reformed the greater part:
Those in the vessels shall be endured by the enemy,
When a new leopard shall have Rome.

(L'union feincte sera peu de duree,
Des uns changés reformés la pluspart:
Dans les vaisseaux sera gent enduree,
Lors aura Rome un nouveau liepart.

NOTES: The feigned union: An ineffective international organization of the League of Nations (1920-1946).

Sera peu de duree: = Sera [de] peu de durée, the preposition [de] being left out by a prophetic embroilment as Augures, creuz eslevés [à] aruspices (§762, III-26). Cf. A l'Entrée des Prophéties, §5, Catégorie d: Ellipse de prépositions pour embrouiller prophétiquement.

The feigned union shall be of brief duration: = A gray bird... shall die soon (§786, I-100): « League of Nations. An international organization created in 1920 to preserve peace and settle disputes by arbitration or conciliation... In the pre-war crisis of 1938-39 the Great Powers tended to ignore the existence of the League... It was formally dissolved in April 1946.» (Palmer, p.157-158)

Some changed: = « When Congress refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, the U.S.A. dissociated itself from the League and never became a member. Germany belonged to the League only from 1926 to 1933, Russia from 1934 to 1939. Brazil withdrew from the League in 1926, Japan in 1933, Italy in 1937.» (Palmer, p.158)

Reformed the greater part
: Most of the member-states of the League in the World War II rallied to the Allies pivoting on Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., that developed into the new post-war organization of the United Nations including the U.S.A. as one of its most influential powers. In fact, of 63 member-states in all of the League between its beginning in 1920 and its end in 1946, 47 states rallied to the Allies in declaring war upon Germany (cf. Ploetz, 1998, p.757).

Those in the vessels: = The Anglo-American invading armies of Sicily in 1943; « Invasion of Sicily 9 July -17 August 1943. The Anglo-American invasion and capture of Sicily was a vital stepping-stone for the campaign in Italy, although the Allies were at fault in failing to prevent the Axis from successfully evacuating their best divisions from the island to continue the defensive battle on the mainland. While the British wanted to pursue an offensive against Italy after the Allied capture of Tunisia, their U.S. partners were less enthusiastic, but the British prevailed. The invasion of Sicily, the first part of the plan, was a massive undertaking – in Europe, second only to D-Day – involving 2,600 Allied ships [the vessels] and sustained air support. The invading force was made up of two armies – the U.S. Seventh Army and the British Eighth Army – and once ashore the Allies pressed forward in an attempt to destroy and capture the Axis units on the island. The few German troops on Sicily were quickly reinforced to a total of four elite divisions, along with a substantial Italian force. Commanded by Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the Germans skillfully used the island’s mountainous terrain to carry out an effective delaying operation. The Allies, especially the British, advanced cautiously against the Germans. Although Hitler insisted that Sicily must be held at all costs, Kesselring soon realized that he must abandon the island if his German formations and their valuable weapons and equipment were not to be lost to the Allies. On the night of 11-12 August the Germans began a well-executed withdrawal that saw 40,000 German and 60,000 Italian troops cross over to the mainland with minimal hindrance from the Allies.» (Grant, 2011, p.856); « Finally the Big Three [Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt] called from Yalta for the remaining neutrals to declare war on Germany before 1 March 1945 and thus gain a ticket of admittance to the founding conference of the United Nations at San Francisco.» (Campbell, 1985, p.147). In response to this call, 12 countries declared war anew upon Germany by 27 March 1945 (Ploetz, id.).

Those in the vessels shall be endured by the enemy
: « Salerno 9-16 September 1943. The signing of the armistice between Italy and the Allies on 3 September 1943 might have seemed to support Churchill’s claim that Italy was the “soft underbelly of Europe,” but the fierce and intelligent resistance displayed by the Germans at Salerno was a portent of things to come. While Field Marshal Montgomery’s British Eighth Army had an easy, unopposed landing at Reggio di Calabria, the Allied amphibious assault against mainland Italy in the Gulf of Salerno did not go as planned. Under the command of Lieutenant General Mark Clark’s U.S. Fifth Army, the landing force was drawn from the British X Corps, which would hit the beaches at Salerno, and the U.S. VI Corps, acting as a flank guard and landing farther to the south. The X Corps troops faced little resistance as they reached the beaches on 9 September 1943, but once ashore they came under sustained attack from the German XIV Panzer Corps. The U.S. VI Corps faced similar problems, unable to push forward from its beachhead. When, on 12 September, the Germans mounted a concerted counterattack, it seemed possible that the Allies might lose their tenuous hold on the Italian mainland. But the arrival of reinforcements – including a parachute drop by two battalions of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division – and the mass redeployment of Allied airpower to the Salerno front turned the tide. On 16 September the Germans disengaged from the battle and began to withdraw to a specially prepared defensive line farther north; meanwhile, U.S. troops on the right of the beachhead made contact with units from the Eighth Army advancing from the south. As the Germans fell back, the Allies occupied the key port of Naples.» (Grant, id., p.858);

« Monte Cassino 17 January-18 May 1944. The struggle for Monte Cassino in World War II sucked Allied troops on the Italian front into a brutal battle that lasted four bloody months. While Allied material strength was to decide the day ultimately, the Germans again demonstrated their determination and skill in defensive operations. Allied progress up the “boot” of Italy had ground to a halt during the winter of 1943 to 1944, thwarted by the German Gustav Line [Those in the vessels shall be endured by the enemy]. The towering hill of Monte Cassino – topped by a historic monastery – was the linchpin in the line, which the Allies were determined to capture... The fourth battle, spearheaded by the Polish Corps, finally took the hill. The Germans had already decided to retire to a new defensive line farther north, and when the lead Polish troops gained the summit of the hill on 18 May, they found it unoccupied.» (Grant, id., p.861);

« Anzio 22 January-25 May 1944. Intended as a daring outflanking move that would open up the way to the capture of Rome, the Anzio landings degenerated into World War II deadlock: the Allies unable to drive forward from their bridgehead and the Germans without the means to push the invaders back into the sea. Having failed to break through the German Gustav Line the Allies proposed to land an amphibious force on the (western) Italian coast behind German lines. A combined U.S.-British operation, under the command of Major General John Lucas’s U.S.VI Corps, it lacked the resources to be effective. The landing on 22 January did, however, achieve complete surprise and were virtually uncontested. Responding with their customary alacrity, the Germans soon had the Allied troops corralled within a tight perimeter. The geography favored the Germans, too; they held a ring of high ground above the Allied position and poured down a massive volume of artillery fire on the soldiers holding the marshy ground below. Both sides reinforced their positions, which further encouraged a tactical stalemate [Those in the vessels shall be endured by the enemy], conditions reminiscent of World War I. Lucas was made a scapegoat and replaced by Major General Lucien Truscott, but he too could not little to break the deadlock. It was only the slow, relentless pressure applied on land and in the air throughout Italy that forced the Germans to give way. On 25 May, with the Germans in retreat, the men from the Anzio bridgehead met up with Allied troops fighting their way up from the south. On 5 June, the Allies marched into Rome unopposed.» (Grant, id.); « ... Rome fell on 4 June, but by autumn 1944 the Germans were again making a stand, this time on the Gothic Line just north of Florence.» (Sommerville, 2008, p.135).

A new leopard: The two examples of « liepard (leopard, panther) » in the quatrain I-23 (§832) refer to Mussolini (cf. Ionescu, 1976, p.530), and here « un nouveau liepart (a new leopard, a new panther) », who shall occupy Rome anew in place of the Italian chief, refers to Hitler designated in the cited quatrain as “sanglier (a wild boar)”. Besides, the alternative character “T” of the irregular orthography “liepart” (‘lie-’ itself instead of LEO being naturally derived from “lion”) seems to suggest the ‘T’ of ‘Hitler’. The identification by Ionescu of ‘a new leopard’ with ‘a leopard’ of the quatrain I-23, thence with Mussolini (Ionescu, id.), is utterly erroneous. Because of this he could not give any interpretation about the quatrain I-23 in its entirety.

When a new leopard shall have Rome
: « Hitler, by contrast, had wasted no time in taking steps to counter the likelihood that the new Italian Government would seek peace and abandon the alliance with Germany. On the day of the coup d’état in Rome, July 25 [1943], Rommel had arrived in Greece to take command there, but just before midnight he received a telephone call telling him that Mussolini had been deposed, and that he was to fly back at once to Hitler’s headquarters in the East Prussian forests. Arriving there at noon next day he ‘received orders to assemble troops in the Alps and prepare a possible entry into Italy’... So by the beginning of September eight German divisions under Rommel were established inside Italy’s Alpine frontier-wall as a potential support or reinforcement to Kesselring’s forces in the south. Moreover the 2nd Parachute Division, a particularly tough force, was flown from France to Ostia, close to Rome. General Student, the Commander-in-Chief of the German airborne forces, went with it. When interrogated after the war, he said: “The Italian High Command was given no previous warning of its arrival, and was told that the division was intended for the reinforcement of Sicily or Calabria. But my instructions, from Hitler, were that I was to keep it near Rome, and also take under my command the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division, which had moved down there. With these two divisions I was to be ready to disarm the Italian forces around Rome.” The presence of these divisions nullified the Allies’ plan to drop one of their own airborne divisions, the 82nd American (General Matthew Ridgway), on Rome itself to support the Italians in holding the capital... Marshal Badoglio had kept five Italian divisions concentrated in the Rome area despite the Germans’ efforts to persuade him to send some of these divisions to help in defending the coast in the south... On September 3, the invasion was opened by Montgomery’s Eighth Army crossing the narrow Straits of Messina, from Sicily, and landing on the toe of Italy. That same day the Italian representatives secretly signed the armistice treaty with the Allies. But it was arranged that the fact should be kept quiet until the Allies made their second and principal landing – which was planned to take place on the shin of Italy, at Salerno, south of Naples.» (Hart, 1971, p.451-452).

« At midnight on September 8 the Anglo-American Fifth Army under General Mark Clark began to disembark in the Gulf of Salerno – a few hours after the B.B.C. had broadcast the official announcement of Italy’s capitulation. The Italian leaders had not been expecting the landing to come so soon, and they were warned about the delivery of the broadcast only late in the afternoon. Badoglio complained, with some justification, that he was caught unready to co-operate, before his preparations were complete. But the Italians’ state of unreadiness and trepidation had already become so evident to General Maxwell Taylor, who had been sent to Rome secretly by Eisenhower, that Ridgway’s intended airborne descent on Rome had been cancelled after Eisenhower had received that morning a warning message from Taylor that the prospects were poor. The broadcast announcement of the Italian capitulation also took the Germans by surprise, but their action in Rome was prompt and decisive, despite the simultaneous emergency in the south produced by the landing at Salerno. The outcome might well have been different if Italian action had matched Italian acting, which had gone a long way to conceal intentions and lull Kesselring’s suspicions during the preceding days. A piquant account of this is given in a narrative written by his Chief of Staff, General Westphal: “On September 7 the Italian Minister of Marine, Admiral Count de Courten, called on Field-Marshal Kesselring to inform him that the Italian Fleet would put out on the 8th or 9th from Spezia to seek battle with the British Mediterranean Fleet. The Italian Fleet would conquer or perish, he said, with tears in his eyes. He then described in detail its intended plan of battle.” These solemn assurances made a convincing impression. The next afternoon Westphal and another general, Toussaint, drove to the headquarters of the Italian Army in Monterotondo (sixteen miles north-east of Rome). “Our reception by General Roatta was very cordial. He discussed with me in detail the further joint conduct of operations by the Italian 7th and German 10th Armies in Southern Italy. While we were talking a telephone message came through from Colonel von Waldenburg with the news of the broadcast announcement of the Italian capitulation to the Allies... General Roatta assured us that it was merely a bad propaganda manœuvre. The joint struggle, he said, would be continued just as had been arranged between us.” Westphal was not altogether convinced by these assurances and when he got back to the German headquarters at Frascati late in the evening he found that Kesselring had already signalled to all subordinate commands the code-word ‘Axis’ – the pre-arranged signal which meant that Italy had quitted the Axis and that the appropriate action must be taken to disarm the Italians immediately. The subordinate commands applied a mixture of persuasion and force according to the situation and their own disposition. In the Rome area, where the potential odds against him were heavy, Student used shock tactics. “I made an attempt to seize the Italian General Headquarters by dropping on it from the air. This was only a partial success. While thirty generals and a hundred and fifty other officers were captured in one part of the headquarters, another part held out. The Chief of the General Staff had got away, following Badoglio and the King, the night before.” Instead of trying to overcome Student’s couple of divisions, the Italian commanders hastened to withdraw out of reach, falling back eastward to Tivoli with their forces, and leaving their capital in the hands of the Germans.» (Hart, id., p.452-454).
© Koji Nihei Daijyo, 2018. All rights reserved. 


Koji Nihei Daijyo

Author:Koji Nihei Daijyo
We have covered 143 quatrains (§588-§730) concerning the World Events in the 19th century after Napoleonic ages [1821-1900] in the Prophecies of Nostradamus, and 218 in the 20th [1901-2000] (§731-§948).

Latest journals