§810 Adolf Hitler vs. Joseph Stalin (1941-1944): IX-90.

IX-90 (§810):

A captain of the great Germany
Shall, by enmity, bring relief
To the King of kings bringing to himself an aid of Pannonia,
That his revolt shall cause a grand flow of blood.

(Un capitaine de la grand Germanie
Se viendra rendre par simulté secours
Au Roy des roys ayde de Pannonie,
Que sa revolte fera de sang grand cours.)

NOTES: La grand Germanie (the great Germany): = Nazi Germany, Germany having been called « the Great Germany » after the annexation of Austria in 1938 (cf. Kimura, 2001, p.325; Ionescu, 1976, p.499).

A captain of the great Germany: = the Führer Adolf Hitler (Ionescu, id.). The other examples of the term ‘captain’ in the Prophecies of Nostradamus refer to the Constable of France Anne de Montmorency in 1557 (VII-28, §21), to the Governor of Cyprus Nicolo Dandolo in 1571 (IV-92, §102), to Henri de Navarre (since Henri IV) in 1588 (VII-9, §174) and to Napoléon Bonaparte in 1812 (IV-83, §493).

Un capitaine de la grand Germanie Se viendra rendre par simulté secours Au Roy des roys ayde de Pannonie: The construction will be as follows: Un capitaine de la grand Germanie se viendra rendre par simulté secours Au Roy des roys [et] se viendra rendre ayde de Pannonie.

Simulté: = « haine, inimitié (hatred, enmity).» (Godefroy).

The King of kings
: = Joseph Stalin, the Chief par excellence [the King] among the chiefs [kings] of Soviet Socialist Republics (cf. Ionescu, id.).

A captain of the great Germany Shall, by enmity, bring relief To the King of kings (Un capitaine de la grand Germanie se viendra rendre par simulté secours Au Roy des roys): = The German initiative to the Nonaggression Pact between the profoundly suspicious Hitler and Stalin in August 1939: « On May 3 [1939] a warning, unmistakable except to the blind, was conveyed in the news that Litvinov, Russia’s Foreign Commissar, had been ‘released’ from office. He had long been the chief advocate of co-operation with the Western Powers in resistance to Nazi Germany. To his post was appointed Molotov, who was reported to prefer dealing with dictators to dealing with liberal democracies. Tentative moves towards a Soviet-Nazi entente began in April... On August 23 Ribbentrop flew to Moscow, and the pact was signed. It was accompanied by a secret agreement under which Poland was to be partitioned between Germany and Russia. But the Soviet-German Pact, coming so late, did not have the effect on the British that Hitler had reckoned. On the contrary, it aroused the ‘bulldog’ spirit – of blind determination, regardless of the consequences, In that state of feeling, Chaimberlain could not stand aside without both loss of face and breach of promise. Stalin had been only too well aware that the Western Powers had long been disposed to let Hitler expand eastward – in Russia’s direction. It is probable that he saw the Soviet-German Pact as a convenient device by which he could divert Hitler’s aggressive dynamism in the opposite direction. In other words, by this nimble side-step he would let his immediate and potential opponents crash into one another. At the least this should produce a diminution of the threat to Soviet Russia, and might well result in such common exhaustion on their part as to secure Russia’s post-war ascendancy. The Pact meant the removal of Poland as a buffer between Germany and Russia – but the Russians had always felt that the Poles were more likely to serve as a spearhead for a German invasion of Russia than as a barricade against it. By collaborating in Hitler’s conquest of Poland, and dividing it with him, they would not only be taking an easy way of regaining their pre-1914 property but be able to convert eastern Poland into a barrier space which, though narrower, would be held by their own forces. That seemed a more reliable buffer than an independent Poland. The Pact also paved the way for Russia’s occupation of the Baltic States and Bessarabia, as a wider extension of the buffer [relief To the King of kings].» (Hart, 1971, p.13-14).

« Early in June 1940, while Hitle was still engaged in the French campaign, Stalin had seized the opportunity to occupy Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Hitler had agreed that the Baltic States should be within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, not to their actual occupation, and he felt that he had been tricked by his partner, although most of his advisers realistically considered the Russian move into the Baltic States to be a natural precaution, inspired by fear of what Hitler might attempt after his victory in the West. Hitler’s deep distrust of Russia had been shown in the way he worried throughout the campaign in the West at having left only ten divisions in the East, facing a hundred Russian divisions. Then on June 26, again without notice to her partner, Russia addressed an ultimatum to Rumania, demanding the immediate restoration of Bessarabia, and the surrender of northern Bukovina in addition – as a ‘small compensation’ for the way that Russia had been ‘robbed’ of the former province in 1918. The Rumanian Government was allowed only 24 hours for its answer, and when it yielded to the threat the Russian troops swarmed in at once, by air as well as overland... The plan for an offensive against Russia had already been sketched out when General Paulus (later to become famous as commander of the army that was trapped by the Russians at Stalingrad) became Deputy Chief of the General Staff at the beginning of September. He was instructed ‘to examine its possibilities’. The objectives defined were, first, the destruction of the Russian armies in western Russia; and then an advance into Russia deep enough to secure Germany against the risk of air attack from the east, carried as far as a line from Archangel to the Volga... On November 10 Molotov arrived in Berlin to discuss a wide range of questions, including the German suggestion that Russia should definitely join the Axis. At the end of the conversations an agreed communiqué was issued, saying: ‘The exchange of ideas took place in an atmosphere of mutual trust, and led to a mutual understanding on all important questions interesting Germany and the Soviet Union.’ But ‘mutual trust’ was entirely lacking, and the diplomatic phrase never had a more hollow ring [by enmity]. On the 12th Hitler’s War Directive No. 18 had said:

 Political discussions had been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these  discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

While the diplomats were talking the military plans were progressing. On December 5 Hitler received [the Chief of the General Staff] Halder’s report on the eastern plan, and on the 18th issued ‘Directive No. 21 – ‘Case Barbarossa’. It opened with the decisive statement: ‘ The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England’. On January 10 [1941] a fresh treaty was signed with Russia that embodied the results of the November conversations with Molotov on frontier and economic wuestions. The surface was thus made to look smoother. But Hitler’s private view was expressed in his coment that Stalin was an ‘ice-cold blackmailer’ [by enmity]. At the same time disquieting reports came from Rumania and Bulgaria about Russian activity there.» (Hart, 1971, p.143-147).

His revolt: = The revolt of Hitler against Stalin notwithstanding their pact of Nonaggression. The interpretation by Ionescu of the term ‘revolt’ as ‘a military retreat’ (Ionescu, 1976, p.499) is not suppported lexically and contextually. Cf. §831, VI-77: the German revolt.

That his revolt shall cause a grand flow of blood: « Operation Barbarossa 22 June – 6 October 1941. The opening of the Eastern Front during World War II occurred in June1941, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union; many observers assumed the Red Army would collapse within twelve weeks. The ability of the Soviet Union to recover from its appalling early defeats would doom Nazi Germany. Stalin believed he had bought off Hitler through the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and refused to accept warnings – reputedly eighty-four in all – of an impending attack. The invasion [his revolt], therefore, came as a terrible shock. Although the Red Army was being modernized, too much equipment was obsolete, and too many senior officers had been swept up by the purges. The initial onslaught was devastating. Hundreds of Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground, troops stationed near the frontiers were abandoned without orders, and confused soldiers found German propaganda leaflets informing them that Moscow had already surrendered. Soviet civilians, long assured that their homeland was safe, were bewildered by the unfolding catastrophe. However, after twelve days, Stalin made a radio broadcast to rally his shaken people, whom he addressed for the first time as “brothers and sisters,” in which he appealed to Russian patriotism – rather thanBolshevik ideology – calling for scorched-earth tactics and a partisan war. In the shor term, the Red Army would suffer desperate shortages of arms, but the Soviet Union would be amply provisioned to fight a prolonged war... By late October, when the advance on Moscow was resumed, many German oddicers doubted that the city could be reached before winter. The offensive was loosing momentum and would be stopped at the Battle of Moscow. Losses: German, 250,000 dead, 500,000 wounded; Red Army, 1,000,000 dead, 3,000,000 wounded, 3,300,000 captured.» (Grant, 2011, p.820-821).

« Leningrad 4 September 1941 – 27 January 1944. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, Leningrad was placed under siege. The loss of the city would have been a severe blow to Soviet morale, and the 872-day siege came to symbolize the determination of the Soviet people. Losses: German, unknown; Red Army, 1,000,000 dead, wounded or captured, plus 1,000,000 civilians dead.» (Grant, id., p.822).

« Moscow 30 September 1941 – 7 January 1942. An Eastern Front battle, the fight for Moscow was the climax of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans intended to take the Soviet capital, assuming that this would break the Soviet Union’s will to fight on. Their failure ultimately doomed the Third Reich. Losses: German, 250,000 - 400,000 dead or wounded; Red Army, 600,000 – 1,300,000 dead, wounded or captured.» (Grant, id., p.823).

A captain of the great Germany Shall bring to himself an aid of Pannonia (Un capitaine de la grand Germanie se viendra rendre ayde de Pannonie = Un capitaine de la grand Germanie rendra ayde de Pannonie à soi-même): « 22 June 1941 German invasion of the U.S.S.R. without a declaration of war. Roumania, Italy, Slovakia and Hungary joined the war on the German side.» (
PenguinAtlas 2, p.207), Pannonia corresponding mainly to Hungary and by metonymy to her surrounding countries such as Italy, Roumania and Slovakia (cf. Bescherelle, s.v. Pannonie).
© Koji Nihei Daijyo, 2019. All rights reserved. 



Koji Nihei Daijyo

Author:Koji Nihei Daijyo
We have covered 143 quatrains (§588-§730) concerning the World Events in the 19th century after Napoleonic ages [1821-1900] in the Prophecies of Nostradamus, and 218 in the 20th [1901-2000] (§731-§948).

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