§858 The death of Roosevelt; Soviet Machinations (1943-): IV-6.

20th century:
§858 The death of Roosevelt; Soviet Machinations (1943-): IV-6.

IV-6 (§858):

Putting on new clothes after the truce was made,
There shall be malice, intrigue and machination:
He shall die first who shall have had proof of it.
The Venetian colour, insidiousness.

(D'habits nouveaux apres faicte la treuve,
Malice tramme & machination:
Premier mourra qui en fera la preuve
Couleur venise insidiation.)

NOTES: Treuve: « 1. Trouvaille (discovery); 2. v. Treve (see Treve); 3. Sorte de plante (a kind of plant).» (Huguet); « Treve. Unes trefves. Une trève (= une trêve, a truce).» (Huguet).

Tramme: = « trame. Plot, intrigue, conspiracy.» (Dubois).

Putting on new clothes after the truce was made, There shall be malice, intrigue and machination: « After the end of the war, the Soviet Union shall adopt a new tactics in relation to the Occidental Powers. They shall consist in defamation full of malice, intrigue and subversive actions including espionage.» (Ionescu, 1976, p.605).

He shall die the first who shall have made proof of it
: « Roosevelt – the first who shall die [April 12, 1945] among the three grand Allies – shall have an occasion of being convinced of it.» (Ionescu, id.). But this occasion was not one at Yalta in 1945 as Ionescu teaches so, but that immediately after Teheran in 1943; « For years Roosevelt had wanted to meet Stalin, and transform his Herculean duets with Churchill into three-power talks. Over a prolonged interval Stalin had delayed the climax of a meeting for several reasons, among them his own suspiciousness and basic hostility to the West and also the fact that he was the active military leader of the Russian forces and could not spare time out of Moscow during a period of supreme crisis. The route to Teheran was prepared by several other conferences, like Molotov’s visit to Washington, and Hull’s to Moscow; also FDR and the Russian dictator secretly exchanged longhand letters. It has been well said that this conference in Persia, bringing together for the first time the effective spokesmen of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the British Empire, represented a concentration of physical power and political authority unique in the whole history of mankind. FDR’s Russian policy had, from its inception, been on the basis of calculated risk. He was torn between twin fears (a) that Russia might be beaten; (b) that Russia might win too much and conquer Europe. ‘In all our dealings with Stalin,’ he once told the former Polish Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, ‘we must keep our fingers crossed.’ Roosevelt was, of course, meeting Stalin for the first time, whereas Churchill had encountered him before. The President made all-out efforts to win the Soviet dictator’s esteem; it pleased him that he and Stalin got along personally better than Churchill and Stalin did. But I have heard from some several participants at the conference that Stalin was seemingly perplexed by Roosevelt, though he treated him with great deference. Churchill he could grapple with. Stalin gave the impression that he understood Churchill perfectly, and that there was even a community between them, as between lusty fellow-rogues. But FDR was much more difficult, a new type of phenomenon puzzling to the glacierlike Russian’s mind, nervously elusive, too optimistic, strangely discursive, and perhaps naïve. This celebrated Teheran Conference about which so much nonsense has been written had the simplest kind of overriding aim – to consolidate the military efforts of the three powers, establish incontrovertibly the fact that the western allies would invade France the next year and thus inaugurate the Second Front, and make derivative preparation for the peace by settling, if possible, the German problem… It was at Teheran, not Yalta, that Stalin promised to enter the war against Japan as soon as the German war was over. Actually our chief worry at this time – the fact may seem incredible but survey of the relevant records will prove it – was that the Russians might become a belligerent against Japan too soon. Reason: Germany was by no means beaten at this time, neither was Japan, and if Russia was suddenly forced to fight on another front, the Germans might have recouped their Russian losses and together with Japan knocked the Soviet Union out of the war. But the chief issue at Teheran, which still sings around the very word ‘Teheran’, and its chief result, was
OVERLORD, the invasion of western Europe by Great Britain and America, the killer’s thrust against Germany straight through France. FDR’s motive for pushing OVERLORD was double: (1) He accepted the unanimous advise of his principal military advisers that this was incomparably the best of all possible ways to save countless thousands of American lives; (2) he wanted to work just as closely and amicably as possible with the Soviet Union in order to bring it wholeheartedly into the new international organization and a decent, lasting peace. Churchill’s point of view was much more subtle and complex. Instead of a single giant lunge across western Europe, he also favoured attack on Germany through the ‘soft underbelly’ – Italy, south-eastern Europe, and the Balkans. Of course he wanted to win the war quickly too, but also he was thinking in long-range terms of what would be the balance of power in those regions after the war. In part, at least, he stubbornly urged the underbelly campaign for political reasons. He wanted to keep Russia out of eastern Europe, or at least to check her influence there, and thus preserve the Continent from further infection by the Red Army and /or Communism. Stalin naturally wanted the overwhelming emphasis to be on Normandy, and he too had obvious political reasons. Churchill wanted Normandy plus the Mediterranean. FDR (though he was not averse to subordinate action in the south) cast the deciding vote, and took Stalin’s side. Of course, it was all but impossible for Churchill to overrule FDR; he always had to keep in mind the preponderance of American manpower and industrial potential. ‘Roosevelt,’ General Deane has said, ‘was thinking of winning the war; the others were thinking of their relative positions when the war was won.’» (Gunther, 1950, p.363-366); « Roosevelt (and Churchill) talked of what ‘grand allies’ the Russians were, but they were not duped or unwarrantably pro-Russian. FDR began to see how the Russians were playing their own deep game and were grabbing for every illicit advantage immediately after Teheran [He shall have made proof of it], when Soviet officials double-crossed him on the time of release of an important document. Perhaps, all in all, the best summary is to say that FDR was gambling at Yalta. His eyes were open, and he knew perfectly well the risks he was taking. What he was gambling for was permanent peace on a moral, idealistic, one-world basis. Unfortunately he lost.» (Gunther, id., p.387-388).

: « Treacherous, crafty; proceeding secretly or subtly (insidious disease). [L (insidiae ambush].» (Sykes).

The Venetian colour, insidiousness
: « In order to make clear that it concerns the policy of the Communists, Nostradamus employs the expression “Venetian colour”, the Venetian red, the colour known among the painters since the Medieval Age, and which serves us here as designating “the Reds” by metonymy. The policy of the “Reds” shall be characterized by a subreptitious penetration, like an apparently benign disease and which one cannot already combat when one feels it.» (Ionescu, id.); « RED COLOURS. Reds are abundant in nature. Red clays, red stone, of many hues, remind us of the great variety of red coulours with which the oxides of iron decorate the face of Mother Earth. But by no means every red clay or stone makes a good pigment, or even a usable pigment. Many earths seem in nature to be strongly coloured which, if they are dried, have no useful colour left in them. A small amount of colouring material will tinge a clay strongly while it is damp, but will hardly show itself when the clay is dry. Many stones seem richly coloured which, if they were ground to powder, would prove colourless. If one were so extravagant as to powder up a ruby, even a ruby of the deepest dye, the result would be a pure white dust. (This fact can be demonstrated at less expense with a bit of coloured glass.) Ochres to be good must consist very largely of the coloured salts of iron and not, as most earths do, contain much feebly coloured clay. The best ochres for the painter are deposits formed by the weathering of iron ores; and they can be converted by washing, by levigation, into almost pure iron oxides. Deposits of pure iron oxide in the form of hematite were regarded as an important source of red colour in the Middle Ages. Sinopia. In classical antiquity the great source of red ochres was Pontus Euxinus, and the choicest red earth came from the Pontine city of Sinope. This red was a valuable monopoly, and ancient Greece and Rome looked to Sinope to maintain the quality of its product. To guard against substitutions the colour was sold under a seal (stamped into the cakes of colour, we may suppose), and was known as “sealed Sinope.” In the Middle Ages the name of Sinope came to be applied to others of less distinction, and the Latin and Italian word sinopia came to mean simply a red ochre. We have even an English word from the same source, “sinoper,” which means the same, an earth red. The Range of Ochres. Red ochres vary enormously in colour. Some are quite light and warm, like that which we now call Venetian red, and others are very dark and cold and purple, like our Indian red or caput mortuum. Some are clear and strong, others more or less tinged by admixture of other materials than iron oxides. There is a red, a terra rosa, from Pozzuoli, near Naples, which has a delightful salmon pink quality which we may think we recognize in some medieval Italian wall paintings. There is the deep maroon of ground hematite, which we may be quite sure we see on walls in Florence.» (Thompson, 1956, p.97-99).
© Koji Nihei Daijyo, 2019. All rights reserved.


Koji Nihei Daijyo

Author:Koji Nihei Daijyo
We have covered 143 quatrains (§588-§730) concerning the World Events in the 19th century after Napoleonic ages [1821-1900] in the Prophecies of Nostradamus, and 218 in the 20th [1901-2000] (§731-§948).

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