§640. Two nephews of Napoleon I

19th century:
§640. Two nephews of Napoleon I (1808-1891): III-29.

The two nephews nourished in various places:
Fathers having fallen in naval fights, on land.
They shall come to be elevated so high, being challenged
Shall revenge the insult: enemies crashed.

(Les deux nepveus en divers lieux nourris:
Navale pugne, terre, peres tumbés
Viendront si haut eslevés enguerris
Venger l’injure: ennemis succombés.)

Keys to the reading:
Two nephews: The sons of two brothers of Napoleon I (1769-1821), i.e., Napoleon III (1808-1873), son of Louis Bonaparte (1778-1846), and Prince Napoleon (1822-1891), son of Jerome Bonaparte (1784-1860). Far from the rash comment of Hogue (1997, p.248): “Look into the past 440 years and pick two nephews. Or worse, pick a couple due to arrive in the next few thousand years. Either way you go, no clear or definitive interpretation can be extracted.”, 8 examples (§617,VIII-32; §627,VII-43; §630,VIII-43bis; §637,III-29; §650, IV-73; §672,VI-22; §679,X-30) of the 12 uses in all of the term “nephew” in the Prophecies of Nostradamus refer to Napoleon III, “the grand nephew” (§650, IV-73) of Napoleon I, and here in addition we are to find another accompanying him in his reign among numerous nephews of Napoleon Bonaparte;

Nourished in various places: Napoleon III: «As a young man brought up mainly by his mother, he travelled extensively, living in Italy, Bavaria, Switzerland and London» (Palmer, p.196). Prince Napoleon in Wurtemberg and Florence (cf. De Puy, 1856, p.342-343);

Fathers: Pl. “ancestors” (Ibuki);

Fathers having fallen in naval fights, on land: Napoleon I loses the battles of Trafalgar in 1805 and also of Waterloo in 1815 where does assist Jerome Bonaparte;
They shall come to be elevated so high: Louis Napoleon in Presidency in 1848 and Emperor in 1852. Jerome Napoleon the First Prince of the blood in 1860 when Jerome Bonaparte, his father, died;

Enguerris: From Enguerroier, faire la guerre à (to make war against) (Godefroy).

The two nephews: « It is well known that Prince Napoleon, son of Jerome Bonaparte, at one time King of Westphalia, and first cousin of Louis Bonaparte, President of the French Republic, was violently opposed to the Coup d’État of December Second; it is known, too, that his political independence very nearly occasioned a serious rupture between him and the man who afterwards became Napoleon III. After the Prince had openly declared his liberal views, a certain coldness arose between the two cousins and kept them apart. This coldness, however, was not destined to last; when Prince Louis Napoleon became Emperor, he summoned his cousin and offered him, if not his full confidence, at least a strong affection. These men had henceforth a true attachment for each other; and despite all that was said to make the Prince appear ridiculous and odious in the eyes of the Emperor, despite even the unconcealed hostility of the Empress toward him, Napoleon III gave his cousin continual evidence of esteem, and ever expressed for him sentiments of profound friendship. State reasons sometimes compelled him to disavow or to blame publicly the utterances or the acts of the Prince; in private, however, he atoned for this severity, and drove from his cousin's memory expressions of an authority which might have wounded him, and whose tendency would have been — so irascible and combative was his temperament — to drive him to a more active opposition, which opposition was, however, on his side less a rivalry than a political dandyism. One anecdote will serve to illustrate the cordiality which existed between the Emperor and his cousin, and will prove that their public dissensions were superficial. One evening Prince Napoleon was at the Tuileries; and having that day given expression to certain seditious sentiments, which had forthwith been repeated to the Emperor, he was taken aside by his cousin and reproved. “I hear, Napoleon,” said the Emperor, “ that you have been at your old tricks again today.” “Have I really been as revolutionary,” the Prince rejoined, laughing, “ as I am reported to have been?” “ Revolutionary,” muttered the Emperor, “is a word which may signify anything or nothing. No, you have not been revolutionary, you have been imprudent. I have in you,” he added, after a pause, “a terrible cousin, Napoleon. You make me a great deal of trouble — a great deal. My ministers are displeased by my conduct toward you. In reality you and I agree about many things, but I cannot let them know that. Ah, Napoleon, you have a great advantage over me, inasmuch as you may express your thoughts without fearing to shock the world.” Prince Napoleon had indeed this privilege which was denied the Emperor; he could, on occasion, though without official sanction, sow seeds of freedom among the people. It was true, too, that the Emperor's secret feelings were often closely allied to those of the Prince. Prince Napoleon was not blind to his cousin's innate kindness of heart, nor to his rare intellectual qualities. He frequently discussed with the Emperor schemes which the latter, unknown to his ministers, took pleasure in elaborating, and which, had he been more resolute, or, let us say, tyrannical, he might have put into execution. If, therefore, there was always a certain restraint between the Emperor and his cousin, this restraint was but the result of the scornful attitude of both courtier and minister toward the Prince, and of the Empress's avowed enmity for him.» (De Lano,1895, p.90-93)

« I have already stated that the Emperor and Prince Napoleon felt a strong attachment for each other, and that all the stories are false which represent these men as bitter enemies, as rivals ready at any moment to fall upon and to harm each other. Prince Napoleon had constantly to undergo, during his cousin's reign, the hatred of the Empress, which hatred inevitably called forth the ill-will and the prejudice of her courtiers. Had the Emperor possessed the courage or the power to interpose between the Prince and his enemies he would have found in this man an useful instrument; he might have put a restraint on his many unwise actions, and made use of his gifts for the imperial cause; a political understanding between these two men, an harmony of purpose which the public should have recognised and respected, would have given the government a firm foundation and have insured the future of the imperial policy. The most serious charge brought against the Prince was that in his speeches he openly and systematically opposed the Emperor's projects. There is, however, a curious fact relating to these speeches of which it is well to remind the reader. Prince Napoleon — I am in a position to verify this statement — never expressed an opinion officially without first submitting his remarks to the Emperor for examination and for approval. Previous to his speaking in public, the Prince invariably gave the Emperor a written version of his address, which the Emperor promptly returned him. If he found therein the expression of some sentiment opposed to his own, Napoleon III, simply suggested that a little revision here and there would be advisable. Such suggestions were, however, never given as a command, nor did he ever condemn any part as evil or dangerous. The Prince always deferred to the Emperor's wish, and revised his manuscript in a way to satisfy him. It, however, sometimes chanced that at the time of delivery he would astonish his cousin by an unexpected violence, and by spontaneous outbursts quite foreign to the text which they had prepared together. The explanation and the excuse for this lie in the fact that between the time of his conversation with the Emperor and that when he delivered his speech — this is a fact to be noted and borne in mind — that in the meantime, I say, intrigues, scandals, annoyances of every kind, had been instigated by the Empress; there was a foolish and profitless delight taken in provoking his excitable and rebellious nature; he was persecuted despite his submission to the wishes of the Emperor; despite his own meekness of spirit, was persecuted and hunted down like a goaded beast in the arena which longs for the undisturbed peace of his own lair. The indignation of the ministry and of the entire court at the time when Prince Napoleon delivered his famous speech in Corsica will be remembered. This very speech, strange as it may seem, this speech which called forth such bitter criticism in the Moniteur and was sought by some as a pretext for exiling the Prince, had been read by the Emperor, and returned by him to his cousin without modification, without comment. "Their purpose is," said Napoleon III to one of his most intimate, one of his most dearly loved friends, “their purpose is to influence me against my cousin, that I may drive him from the Tuileries, and add one more indignity to those which are now heaped upon him; that I may close alike my heart and my home against him. I will never accede to these wishes. I will never look upon the Prince as an enemy. When not in my presence he seems to disapprove of my actions; but when with me he is all that he should be. He is my friend, and there is no hypocrisy in this attitude; he is alike sincere when he expresses an attachment for me, and when, driven to revolt by the bitter hatred which pursues him, by the contempt of which he is a victim, he rises in arms, it is not against me personally, but against the men and also the women who surround me. I forgive his resentment; in his place I do not know how I should act. When humanity attempts indifference to abuse and to insult, it finds itself confronted by a force which it is powerless to overcome. At heart Napoleon loves me, and I require from him nothing more than this. Why should I, by withdrawing my sympathy, add another cause of bitterness to the many which he already has ?” The Emperor took comfort in feeling that the Prince was no hypocrite, and his judgment of him in this respect was certainly right. Prince Napoleon scorned deceit, was loyal in all the relations of life, was open with his adversaries, faced obstacles bravely, though at the risk of doing himself harm, and despised subterfuge and compromise. In these virtues is power sufficient to influence the destiny of a nation. The Prince was, however, neither popular at court nor in the world of politics, nor yet with the masses. Whatever the gifts and the intelligence of a man may be, of however honest a nature he is, he cannot counteract the influence of slander, nor hope to extricate himself from the meshes which calumny weaves round him. Notwithstanding his strong moral and intellectual force, Prince Napoleon thus became the victim of falsehood. He understood the theory of government, but the law-makers would have nothing to do with him; he toiled for the people whose interests he had at heart, and, in return, was ridiculed by them. He was more of a prince, more of an aristocrat, than are many princes and aristocrats, yet he was despised by the upper classes. He was a democrat, but the democrats never gave him their confidence; in short, he was opposed, envied, feared — feared in the face of raillery and scorn, because none could fail to recognise his intellectual superiority, and was like the abortive progeny of a gigantic dream, a dream of the Caesars, upon whom a wicked spirit has cast the evil eye. Prince Napoleon's rôle in the Second Empire was that of a malcontent, of a fault-finder, and almost of a factionist. Yet he not only loved the Emperor and was loved by him, but held views on many questions which were in harmony with his. His liberalism, even his radicalism, were not incompatible with those vague socialistic dreams which haunted the sovereign's mind, while his theories of national unity were peculiarly satisfying to the Emperor's ideals. The consolidation of Germany was not at all alarming to the Prince; but he would have wished it accomplished by an understanding with France, and he was among those who most regretted the failure of M. Bismarck's mission when that statesman went to Biarritz, hoping to win the co-operation of the Tuileries in the fulfilment of his political schemes.» (De Lano, id., p.107-113)

Being challenged Shall revenge the insult: enemies crashed: « During this time, an important phenomenon, which perhaps has not been sufficiently remarked, was produced in the country. The republican idea gained among the people, outside of Paris above all, infinitely more ground than it had lost since the first months of 1848. The retrograde excesses of the Legislative Assembly had thrown back into the democratic movement the very numerous and very influential fraction of the republican party, which had sustained the policy of General Cavaignac, and which, after the days of June, had contributed to the reaction. The arrogance of the priest party, so powerful in the Legislative Assembly, became intractable after the Roman expedition had stimulated the Voltairian spirit of the middling classes (la bourgeoisie). The effacing of revolutionary extremes, joined to the growing progress of liberal socialism (what is called to-day cooperation), toward authoritative socialism, had facilitated a sincere reconciliation between all the shades of the republican party. The resolution, unanimously formed by the Democrats to peaceably await the general elections of 1852; to renounce all appeal to violence; to fortify themselves within the Constitution; to make use of the liberties still intact, in order to enlighten universal suffrage; to propagate the republican idea among the peasantry; and so not to expect definitive triumph except from the regular working of republican institutions, — this resolution, let us say, at the same time that it disconnected the calculations of the reaction, gave a new force to the democratic propaganda. Besides, the Republicans displayed so much order, such a fever for proselytism, that their triumph in the elections of 1852 no longer appeared doubtful. Such at least was the opinion of their alarmed adversaries, as early as the first months of the year 1850. The partial elections of March and April, at Paris, and in many of the departments, were favorable to the election of the republican candidates. At Paris, the divers shades of the democracy had fused together. The impression produced by these elections, which showed what vigorous roots had already been thrown out in the population, was extreme. In the midst of the royalist majority of the Assembly, there was a complete panic; people did not even stop to reflect on this very natural consideration, which after all was but a partial defeat; they believed themselves in peril. The conservatives of the Legislative Assembly, so great was their terror of a legal triumph of the Republicans in 1852, did not recoil before the idea of laying violent hands on the basis of the Constitution itself, — on universal suffrage.» (Ténot et al., 1870, p.20-21)

« Then was prepared the too famous law of the 31st of May, 1850, which, by a stroke of the pen, struck out three millions of electors ! The report was read the 18th of May, by Léon Faucher, its urgency declared, and its discussion commenced immediately. The ministry and the orators of the majority maintained, in spite of good sense and evidence, that their projected law did not violate the article of the Constitution which guaranteed the right of suffrage, without conditions of property, to every French citizen aged twenty-one years, enjoying his civil and political rights. They based themselves upon this argument: that the regulating law of the 15th of March, 1848, requiring for the registration of a citizen upon the electoral list, six months' residence in the commune, they could, without infringing on the fundamental pact, insist on three years (why not twenty or thirty ?) instead of six months. This evident violation of the Constitution in one of its fundamental features, radically changed the situation; it introduced into the country an element of deep perturbation, left everything in doubt again, and challenged a civil war which awaited only a question of time. The Republicans, in fact, against whom this parliamentary coup d'etat was directed, allowed the law of the 31st of May to pass without material opposition; but they did not disguise the fact that if universal sufirage were not reestablished before the general elections of May, 1852, they would consider themselves as authorized to claim the right written in the Constitution, with arms in their hands, if necessary. In passing the law of the 31st of May, the reactionary majority thought to have guaranteed social order against the anarchists.» (Ténot et al., id., p.21-23)

« The Legislative Assembly had reached its third year of legislation, and, by virtue of Article 3 of the Constitution, it had the right to convoke an assembly of revision; on the condition, nevertheless, that the vote of revision should have been rendered by the majority consisting of three fourths of those voting. In the autumn of 1850, the General Councils of the departments had formally expressed their wishes on this subject; a general system of petitions, tending toward the same end, had been organized by the agents of the administration from this date. Its success had been notable, but not such as they would have wished to call it. They had obtained one million one hundred thousand signatures, more or less authentic, of which less than four hundred thousand asked for the prolongation of the authority of the President of the Republic. The wishes of the General Councils had not been much more characteristic, concerning the prorogation of the powers of the President. Six only of these councils, out of the ninety, expressed the desire for the abrogation of Article 45, interdicting the reelection of Louis Napoleon, before an interval of four years. The President of the Republic evidently had no doubts upon the fate of the project for the revision, submitted to the National Assembly. In this particular case the republican Left was master of the issue of the debate. The Republicans had at their command about two hundred and twenty votes, a number exceeding one fourth of those voting, and consequently sufficient to defeat, by the terms of Article 3, a vote of revision. Now, upon this question, the Republicans were unanimous. Moderate Republicans, those of the Mountain, Socialists, all considered it their strict duty to oppose the revision so long as the law of the 31st of May should be unrepealed. They could not, in fact, without betraying the sovereignty of the people, consent that the Constitution of 1848, elaborated by a Constituent Assembly, the issue of universal suffrage, be revised by an assembly which had been produced from a mode of suffrage enacted in formal violation of the Constitution itself. The republican party could not, without violating its fundamental principle, consent to any such transaction. General Cavaignac used the same language on this occasion as the orators of the “Mountain.” Thus, the debate upon the revision could have for the historian but a secondary importance, in spite of the passionate interest it excited, and the fine oratorical rivalries of which it was the occasion. The result was inevitable. The vote took place the 21st of July, 1851. Four hundred and forty-six votes were cast for the revision, and two hundred and seventy-eight against it. That was ninety votes more than were requisite to constitute the quarter sufficient to reject the proposition. Nevertheless, instruction can be derived from the ballot; it is, that the majority had remained almost wholly favorable to the revision. A certain number of Orleanists voted alone with the Republicans. Among them were Messieurs Thiers, de Rémusat, Creton, Bedeau, Baze, etc. Shortly afterward the National Assembly was prorogued — on the 10th of August. The parties remained, at the close of this session, more bitter and more divided than ever. The parliamentary majority who had received such rude assaults from the executive power; who felt themselves threatened; who believed, rightly or wrongly, in the plans of usurpation devised by the President of the Republic; the majority, we say, had not even the idea of becoming reconciled in this common peril, with the republican Left. This latter, besides, suspicious, mistrustful, embittered by the hostilities that had been manifested toward it since the beginning, would with difficulty have yielded to an understanding. On the other hand, the republican party was full of confidence in the future. Unity was reestablished in its ranks. Although some recriminations upon the past were often exchanged, according to their various views, they had acted with no less unity for that since 1849, and most of all since the law of May 31, 1850. The unheard-of progress of the republican propaganda — Socialists, as they were termed by the reactionists — in the agricultural people of the centre, of the east, and of the south, seemed the pledge of an assured triumph for 1852. The democrats made certain of obtaining, ere that date, the abrogation of the law of the 31st of May. They little feared the Coup d’Etat attributed to Louis Napoleon. They shared the opinion of General Changarnier as to the disposition of the army, and they placed, above all, the most unlimited confidence in the attachment of the people of Paris and of the departments, to the republican cause. The attitude of the executive power, as well as that of the royalist parties, toward them, were not taken in order to diminish their confidence in the final triumph. We must read the reactionary papers of the time, notice the debates of the Chambers, look over the reports of the courts, in order to obtain an idea, at the present time, of the fears the monarchical parties manifested in presence of the republican sentiment.» (Ténot et al., id., p.37-42)
© Koji Nihei Daijyo, 2012. All rights reserved.

Koji Nihei Daijyo

Author:Koji Nihei Daijyo
We have covered 143 quatrains (§588-§730) concerning the World Events in the 19th century after Napoleonic ages [1821-1900] in the Prophecies of Nostradamus, and 219 in the 20th [1901-2000] (§731-§949).

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